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S2TEP-1 is the first in a series of satellites using the Small Satellite Technology 
Platform, in short S2TEP. It is developed by the Institute of Space Systems of the 
German Aerospace Center (DLR) and it will be operated by the German Space 
Operations Center (GSOC) in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. In order to accommodate to 
the overall low mission costs and high mission risk, a lightweight approach based on a 
flexible and (partly) autonomous Ground Segment (G/S) has been foreseen. Synergies 
with other satellite missions at GSOC or with the Central Checkout System (CCS) will 
be used wherever applicable and productive. A high degree of automation shall be 
assured. As the desired degree of external interaction from the customer exceeds that of 
any mission operated by GSOC so far, a Remote Control Center (RCC) has to be 
established, from where anomaly recovery operations and special payload campaigns 
can be performed. The focus of our approach lies on cost effectiveness, a shorter 
development time, user-friendliness and reusability. A high level of security is not 
required by the project, nevertheless an adequate level of reliability and security is 
provided. Three designs that meet these requirements are described and discussed in this 
paper, together with the constraints that arise from implementing them within the 
current network infrastructure at GSOC. The chosen design for the Central Checkout 
and Mission Control and Data System is presented: the final approach results in a 
system built in a nearly traditional way integrated in the multi-mission environment of 
GSOC.  
I. Introduction 
 
The German Aerospace Center (DLR) pursues the objective to develop a cost-effective satellite platform for 
in-orbit demonstration of technology and for serving small scientific payloads. S2TEP-1 is the first in a series of 
satellites using the Small Satellite Technology Platform, in short S2TEP [1]. The first satellite of the S2TEP 
platform will be in the micro-satellite class, to be launched not earlier than mid-2020 and to be operated at least 
for one year. This platform will be used for technology verification and -sustainability and it will provide 
standards and fundamental services for scientific payloads. The micro satellite platform S2TEP has a close 
connection to DLR’s already existing small satellite program CompactSat and its first mission Eu:CROPIS, 
which is scheduled to be launched by the middle of 2018. Technologies developed for S2TEP will also be used 
on the CompactSat platform and technologies which are flown on CompactSat as secondary payloads can later 
be flown on S2TEP as critical bus components [2].  
The ground segment (G/S) will be designed in such a way that it can be easily re-built for future follow-up 
missions. 
Resulting from the mission requirements and operations concept, currently available system designs cannot 
be entirely re-used one to one. A partially new concept had to be developed by the Mission Control and Data 
System (MCDS) team that is responsible for the software used for Monitoring and Control Systems and Offline 
Data Systems at the German Space Operations Center (GSOC). Since the S2TEP-1 mission constraints to the 
ground segment are, in terms of required up- and downlink times, data provision times and especially reaction 
times, lower than for most other missions operated by GSOC, the main design driver has been the integration of 
this newly developed concept into the multi-mission context at GSOC. Massive reuse of existing software 
enables operations at moderate costs while still offering high quality of services. The ground segment is 
designed to enable safe and successful operations throughout the entire mission duration. 
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Whenever possible, commanding during the mission will be based on flight procedures. A large fraction of 
the flight procedures will be developed by the satellite manufacturer as test procedures during the Assembly, 
Integration & Test (AIT) execution. For this reason, the ground segment will provide a Central Checkout 
System (CCS) mostly similar to the later mission commanding system, together with a test procedure 
development, execution and documentation tool that has been already used successfully during the Eu:CROPIS 
AIT. 
This paper discusses the constraints deriving from customer requirements and the mission operations 
concept. After introducing the design of a default Mission Control and Data System at GSOC, three new design 
approaches are described and assessed. The final approach chosen for the MCDS and CCS of the S2TEP-1 
satellite mission is presented. A short conclusion closes this paper.  
II. Constraints for the Ground Segment 
More and more customers desire a greater flexibility of satellite control centers in terms of lower complexity 
of the monitoring and control system and versatile possibilities to interact with the spacecraft. This may be even 
accompanied by reduced security requirements. This is valid for simple, scientific missions as well as for 
commercial and complex missions. This is in contradiction with the traditional infrastructure of a satellite 
control center and with the growing complexity of the space segment and its missions. The amounts of 
telecommands, telemetry, and payload data that must be processed, displayed and distributed are increasing 
significantly. System engineers designing the S2TEP-1 MCDS System are facing the same challenges. 
The S2TEP-1 ground segment has to be implemented in the multi-mission environment of the German Space 
Operations Center in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, in order to use already existing infrastructure and software. 
Synergies with the Eu:CROPIS project, which will also be operated by the German Space Operation Center and 
was also developed by DLR-RY,  shall lead to a minimal amount of effort and costs. 
S2TEP focuses on cost-efficiency and short development times to achieve frequent and more cost-effective 
access to space for smaller scientific payloads and technology experiments. Using synergies and already existing 
ground segment components becomes a crucial concept. Therefore nearly all S/W components from the 
Eu:CROPIS MCDS will be used as-is. Adaptions will only be implemented if the improvement fits to the multi-
mission philosophy of the software group or if the project waives its low-cost approach and pays for them.   
During routine operations, the ground segment will be operated by two operations team members who have 
the role of Flight Directors (FLD) and are responsible for the organization and execution of the routine 
operations of the mission. The ground segment team support is granted only during office hours. During 
weekends and in case of unavailability of all FLDs, the Satellite Support Team (SST) is responsible for the 
safety of the spacecraft. The Flight Directors, thus, will be supported also during the routine operations phase by 
the satellite manufacturer. During all mission phases, the responsibility for the spacecraft safety will be shared 
between the ground segment and the space segment teams: the responsibility for the safety of the spacecraft in 
nominal situations lies with the ground segment. Spacecraft anomalies occurring for the first time will be 
analyzed by the satellite manufacturer that will perform dedicated recovery actions or advice the ground 
segment on necessary actions. Therefore, the G/S needs to provide a possibility for commanding from external 
premises in real time. The satellite manufacturer will have command capability from his site and a Remote 
Control Center (RCC) will be established. 
In contrast to the external commanding of the manufacturer, providing real time telemetry to external 
partners is a well-known and common use case. A tool will be provided to the satellite manufacturer and DLR 
internal payload teams to monitor real time telemetry during a ground station contact, as well as a tool to display 
historical telemetry. 
Although DLR-RY will be granted full commanding possibility through the RCC, all standard security 
requirements for a satellite mission remain applicable, i.e. no third party shall be able to command the satellite. 
As mentioned before, the S2TEP-1 mission will be integrated in the multi-mission system of the German Space 
Operation Center. Thus, it must be avoided that other missions currently operated by GSOC could be harmed by 
any (security) issue within the S2TEP-1 system.  
During the routine operations phase, an automated commanding process [3] will be established. Files that 
ought to be uplinked during a ground station pass are submitted 15 minutes before the pass and are then 
automatically uplinked during the pass. Inputs to the automated commanding system can also be automatically 
generated and inserted into the uplink-process, for instance the generation of transmitter switches, 
housekeeping, and payload data downlinks, the so-called background sequence. The automatic commanding 
mode relies on a purely flight procedure based commanding. 
A Central Checkout System is provided by the ground segment to the satellite manufacturer to ease the 
spacecraft AIT activities and connect to the space segment TM/TC front end. The design and S/W components 
to be used are identical to the system build for routine operations. Therefore the following considerations about 
the MCDS are also valid for the CCS. The intensive use of MCDS components in the checkout system is an 
additional pre-validation of the entire remote commanding system: mission specific configurations will be 
3 
 
already tested at the integration site and potential errors or problems thus detected early in the ground segment 
development phase. 
The Flight Control Procedure (FCP) database is managed by means of the ProToS tool [4] which is linked to 
the TM/TC database, the so-called Mission Information Base (MIB). The procedures prepared by GSOC and 
DLR-RY include both standard and contingency procedures. Flight Procedures are subject to version control. A 
large fraction of the flight procedures will be developed by the satellite manufacturer as test procedures during 
the Assembly, Integration and Validation (AIV) execution. Flight procedures that become necessary for the 
Launch and Early Orbit Phase (LEOP) and routine operations which are not available as a by-product of satellite 
AIV will be generated by the ground segment together with the spacecraft manufacturer.  
In order to ease software and hardware maintenance, only few S/W tools will be installed and located at the 
RCC in Bremen. As best, all S/W tools will be hosted at GSOC and only remote access is granted to the 
operator in Bremen. Any potential issue can then be easily handled by the S/W provider (the Mission Control 
and Data System team) or the hardware provider (the Facility and Communication System department at 
GSOC).  
As S2TEP-1 is a low budget project and the S/C is required to survive at least two weeks without any 
interaction from ground, no redundancy is planned. Moreover, since the system will use mainly virtual 
machines, should any component in the G/S fail to work, it can be replaced or re-installed within this reasonable 
timeframe. 
III. Design of the System 
A. Discussed MCDS Components 
In this section, the S/W system provided by the ground segment is reduced to four main S/W modules: The 
SLE Switch Board (SSB), the GSOC Enhanced Command and Control System for Operating Spacecrafts 
(GECCOS) [5], the telemetry display system Satmon [6] and the Procedure Tool Suite (ProToS). Reducing the 
whole system to these four modules, allows the description of the design principles in a more understandable, 
though still meaningful, manner. The connection from the RCC in Bremen to Oberpfaffenhofen will be realized 
via a VPN Tunnel, which has been already tested during the Eu:CROPIS AIT phase. As previously mentioned, 
the Central Checkout System (CCS) needs to be designed in the same way as the routine operations system. 
Therefore, the considerations done in the following chapters are valid for both. The dedicated S/W modules will 
be described afterwards.  
SSB: The SLE Switch Board (SSB) service establishes the connection between the satellite Monitoring and 
Control System (MCS, e.g. GECCOS) and the ground station using the SLE protocol. The SSB can receive 
telemetry flows from the different stations (mostly as SLE PDUs) and converts them into NCTRS Format 
(Network Command Telemetry Routing System), a data format understood by the MCDS/GECCOS. The SSB is 
able to receive several telemetry flows in parallel and send them to different MCDS instances. In the other 
direction, the SLE receives telecommands from the MCDS software (in NCTRS format), converts them into 
SLE PDUs and sends them to the corresponding station (only one at a time). The SSB is a standard element of 
multi-mission environment of GSOC and will be used as-is. 
GECCOS Server and Client: The TM/TC system to be used for S2TEP-1 is the GSOC Enhanced 
Command & Control system for Operating Spacecrafts (GECCOS), which is based on SCOS 2000. SCOS 2000 
is developed by ESA and is in its core components free for use by other agencies. The SCOS baseline version is 
3.1. It is continually maintained and improved by GSOC as the GSOC product GECCOS. It has been used for 
other GSOC missions (CHAMP, TerraSAR-X, TanDEM-X, FireBIRD, Eu:CROPIS). The version to be used for 
S2TEP-1 is derived from the latest multi-mission branch with appropriate configurational changes. The S2TEP-
1 CCS will also be built with GECCOS as core component. 
Satmon Server and Client: Satmon is used to monitor telemetry in real-time and provides a playback 
function for telemetry received during real-time passes. This application is jointly developed with an external 
supplier. It is used in all GSOC missions as the telemetry user interface. The adaptation to GECCOS has already 
successfully been demonstrated for the GRACE, TerraSAR-X/TanDEM-X, FireBIRD and Eu:CROPIS missions 
and many others. 
ProToS Server and Client: ProToS is a tool that offers a graphical frontend for procedure development, a 
procedure-based automated commanding interface to GECCOS and procedure validation and reporting 
mechanisms. It has been developed by the mission operations department (RB-MIB) of the German Space 
Operation Center. As an eclipse RCP tool it can be deployed on a system with a java virtual machine. 
Procedures are stored in a repository under version control. Several versions of the MIB can also be managed 
inside ProToS. For downwards compatibility, ProToS can import and export flight procedures in a generic XML 
format that is used by the Manufacturing and Operation Information System (MOIS) [7]. Procedure templates 
can be exported as pdf for convenient reading and for test documentation purposes a pdf export of as-run 
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procedures is also possible. ProToS also generates Saved Stack Files (SSF) files, which can be loaded into the 
GECCOS system for command execution. 
B. Default Mission within the multi-mission environment 
GSOC operates several missions in a multi-mission environment. Multi-mission aspects are present in 
various sub-systems, such as the in-house network, the ground station network and software tools. Within the 
control center, three different local area networks (LANs) are defined. For this paper, only the Operational LAN 
(called Ops-LAN) is relevant. It includes the MCS and therefore the high security network area. It is physically 
separated from other networks and only very limited access from outside is permitted. File transfers are allowed 
only over specific FTP server located in the so-called DMZ (Demilitarized Zone).In principle a connection over 
the firewall is only allowed for connections that are established from the Ops-LAN to the DMZ and not vice 
versa. The mentioned DMZ is the typical separator between different LANs. It consists of another network part 
with two firewalls protected entry points. DMZs typically contain only firewalls and FTP servers, in case of 
some specific application the outermost DMZ may, however, also include some application server to provide 
dedicated services to the outside world. The whole MCDS is usually located in the Ops-LAN [Fig. 1]. 
Communication over its network borders is only established to the SSB in order to send commands or receive 
telemetry. 
This default design does not meet the requirements for the S2TEP-1 MCDS, as direct interaction with the 
satellite would then be only possible from the Ops-LAN. Third parties – as payload engineers – would be able 
interact indirectly via the operational engineers at GSOC or more complicated ways. This design is then not 
feasible for S2TEP-1, as only two FLDs are present at GSOC and contingency operations shall be done also 
from the Remote Control Center in Bremen. Consequently new approaches need to be developed. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Default design of an MCS in the multi-mission environment at GSOC 
C. Option 00 
The first design option consists of only one operational chain located in the DMZ. All servers can be 
accessed by clients either located in the Ops-LAN at GSOC or at DLR-RY. In this way, both operational parties 
are able to access the same servers. The communication between clients in the Ops-LAN and the DMZ (and vice 
versa) needs to be realized through firewalls. Connecting the remote servers in the DMZ with the clients in 
Bremen over the Wide Area Network (WAN) can be realized technically by a VPN tunnel which has been 
already tested during the Eu:CROPIS AIT phase. The Eu:CROPIS CCS has been connected to servers at GSOC 
in the same way. Unfortunately this has not been tested for routine operations.  
The operational engineers at GSOC would be able to command the satellite from their accustomed 
environment. Integrating only one server chain meets the low cost approach of the project and eases software 
and hardware maintenance effort. Due to common servers accessed by all parties no synchronization of 
telecommand and telemetry is necessary. Information stored on or provided by the servers is accessible by all 
parties. Any needed share point for additional information can be located in the DMZ as well. Also, with only 
one common server for commanding the satellite it is simpler to restrict the amount of clients that are 
commanding the satellite in parallel. This is the favorite design by the GSOC operations and system engineers. 
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Having the servers located in the DMZ and communicating over network borders poses however security 
matters. Establishing connections from the DMZ into the Ops-LAN is currently not allowed due to security 
restrictions. GECCOS uses the CORBA protocol for communication with its clients by establishing connection 
in both directions. In addition, at least three connections between the Ops-LAN and the DMZ would have to be 
opened [Fig. 2]. This means that at least three connections would lower the security measures against hazardous 
harm to the Ops-LAN. These security gaps are even worse considering that nearly all other satellite missions are 
flying within the multi-mission environment and would be affected directly by any S2TEP-1 security issue.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Option 00: One command chain, clients at GSOC and DLR-RY 
D. Option 01 
According to this design, two separate operational chains are implemented. One chain is located completely 
in the Ops-LAN at GSOC. The second one is located in the DMZ also at GSOC. Operations engineers from 
DLR-RY are able to connect to the servers of the second chain via a VPN Tunnel [Fig. 3]. The operator running 
the SSB can actively choose which chain is connected to the ground station. Thus, it is assured that only one 
party can command the satellite at a time and parallel commanding is avoided. If there is any need for a 
spontaneous switching of the chains, the operator is available twenty-four-seven at GSOC.  
The operations engineers at GSOC are able to command the satellite from their accustomed environment. No 
forbidden connection is established over the network borders between the Ops-LAN and the DMZ. Thus the risk 
of security flaws is minimized.  
On the other side, providing GSOC and the RCC with the same information is very challenging with this 
design. Any command that has been sent or any procedure that has been generated on one chain must be 
synched with the other chain, otherwise the other party has inconsistent information about the operational status. 
This information must be doubled over network borders technically or by operational procedures. Telemetry is 
not affected by this problematic, since it is streamed to all GECCOS servers in parallel by the SSB, anyway. 
Not only information is doubled: in this design, all servers, all clients and all software need to be duplicated. 
The effort for integration, testing and maintenance during the routine phase is significantly higher than for 
option 00. 
As mentioned in section B, the DMZs typically contain only firewalls and FTP servers and not fully 
operational server chains. It is still an open point if the GSOC DMZ is capable of providing enough capacity and 
computing power for operating an operational MCDS chain.  
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Fig. 3 Option 01: Two command chains, clients at DLR-RY 
E. Option 02 
The third design proposal resembles the first one. There is only one operational chain that is located in the 
DMZ. Also the clients are located there. They can be accessed by GSOC as well as by RCC via remote 
connections using remote desktop software, e.g. X2Go4 or NX Nomaschine5. The remote connections from the 
RCC would use a VPN Tunnel to connect into the DMZ.  
The operational engineers at GSOC are able to command the satellite from their accustomed environment. It 
is transparent for them whether the client session they work on is running on a server in the Ops-LAN or in the 
DMZ. Even for operators sitting in the RCC working with a session that runs in the DMZ there is no difference. 
As there is only one client it is assured that only one party can command the satellite at the same time. 
Monitoring the satellite is possible for all parties at the same time by using Satmon. A process for taking over 
sessions must be established technically or organized operationally. Integrating only one server chain meets the 
low cost approach of the project and eases software and hardware maintenance effort. Due to common servers 
accessed by all parties no synchronization for telecommand and telemetry is necessary. 
Using X2Go for terminal server software is well proven within the Ops-LAN (see section B). Terminal 
server connections over network borders through firewalls and especially over the Wide Area Network (WAN) 
are not fully tested yet, so GSOC needs to gather experience concerning this topic. In addition, only few other 
terminal software solutions are available for such remote connections. 
As mentioned in section B, the DMZs typically contain only firewalls and FTP servers and not fully 
operational server chains. It is still an open point if the GSOC DMZ is capable of providing enough capacity and 
computing power for operating an operational MCDS chain.  
As X2Go is an open source remote desktop software that uses the NX technology protocol, it gives remote 
access only to the Linux graphical user interface. It provides secure remote sessions via the Secure Shell 
protocol (SSH). Thus no possible security flaw will be introduced in the system. This design in principle is 
similar to new concepts currently in development at GSOC [8]. Changing the remote connection protocol to 
HTTP may make the access and remote operations more comfortable in future. 
                                                          
4 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/X2Go 
5 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/NX_NoMachine 
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Fig. 4 Option 02: One command chain, clients in DMZ and remote connection to OPS and DLR-RY  
IV. Consolidated System and Central Checkout System 
“Security counts more than costs and effort”. This simple slogan summarizes the weighting of the arguments 
for and against the previously described design concepts. The decision was taken to implement option 01 for 
S2TEP-1, although the costs and effort for S/W and H/W integration and maintenance are significantly higher 
than for the other options. However, it is the most secure option. No forbidden connections over the network 
border between Ops-LAN and the DMZ are established. No possibility to affect the multi-mission environment 
from a third party or by DLR-RY is introduced. SSH connections are commonly seen as very secure, even more 
if only graphical information is transmitted. Therefore it is agreed that the design of option 02 and especially the 
remote connections between Ops-LAN and DLR-RY to DMZ will be tested and validated in order to gather 
experience with these connections outside the Ops-LAN. If these connections result to be robust, secure enough, 
and operationally reasonable, the design will be adapted to option 02, since this is the favored alternative. It was 
described previously that synchronization of data and information might be an issue for the designated design. 
Therefore the data to be synchronized needs to be assessed and defined by MCDS and the Mission Operations 
engineers. 
The first design proposal is not an option to be considered, as long as the current network infrastructure is in 
place at GSOC. The network infrastructure is currently being modernized [8]. Once this new network 
infrastructure is available it will be possible to operate various missions with different requirements in terms of 
security levels in separate VLANs. 
The CCS will be implemented according to the chosen design. It is accessible from the remote control center 
as well as from GSOC in the same manner as an external ground station. From the set-up (see Fig. 5) it is 
transparent for the operator in the control room if the S/C in orbit or an engineering model is currently 
monitored and controlled. Thus ground segment component tests, procedure validation, trainings and 
simulations can easily be supported before launch. Technically this is realized by connecting the control center 
SLE user (SSB) with the SLE provider (available at the CCS in Bremen) over WAN through a VPN tunnel. 
The intensive use of MCDS components in the checkout system is an additional pre-validation of the 
software. Mission specific adaptations and configurations are already tested at the integration site and potential 
errors or problems thus detected early. 
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Fig. 5 Central Checkout System for S2TEP-1 
V. Conclusion 
Although S2TEP is a low cost mission, it necessitates challenging requirements for the ground segment, like 
the external commanding and a highly flexible mission control system. Eu:CROPIS, also a DLR-RY mission, 
follows, however, a more conservative mission operations design. Integrating into the current GSOC 
infrastructure the design that best meets the low-budget requirement of the S2TEP project, could arise security 
concerns. Although these concerns are not relevant to the project S2TEP itself, a security flaw within the 
S2TEP-1 ground system might take hazardous effects to the multi-mission environment and thereby to the other 
satellite missions at GSOC. As a consequence a more expensive design needs to be implemented.  
GSOC has reacted on new requirements from customers and is going to change its network infrastructure in 
order to have the possibility to separate each satellite mission virtually within the multi-mission environment in 
future [8]. 
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